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Summary
In the 1990s, wars and political instability provided an opportunity for Al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups to infiltrate the Balkans.  However, U.S. and European
peacekeeping troops, aid, and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration have helped
to bring more stability to the region in recent years.  Moreover, the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States underscored for the countries of the region the
dangers of global terrorism, and resulted in increased U.S. attention and aid to fight
the terrorist threat.  In part as a result, many experts currently do not view the
Balkans as a key region harboring or funding terrorists, in contrast to the Middle
East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe.  However, experts note that
the region may play a secondary role in terrorist plans, as a transit point for terrorists,
as well as for recuperation. Moreover, they agree that the region’s continuing
problems continue to leave it vulnerable to terrorist groups in the future. 
U.S. officials have cited the threat of terrorism in the Balkans as an important
reason for the need for continued U.S. engagement in the region.  In addition to the
need to take steps to directly combat terrorist infrastructure in the region, U.S.
officials say that U.S. efforts to bring stability to the region also help to fight
terrorism.  They note that political instability, weak political and law enforcement
institutions and poverty provide a breeding ground for terrorist groups.  U.S.
objectives are also outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report and the President’s
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which calls for the United States to work
with other countries to deny terrorists sponsorship, support and sanctuary, as well as
working to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.
The United States has a variety of instruments to fight terrorism in the Balkans.
One is the direct involvement of U.S. troops in Bosnia and Kosovo.  The United
States provides bilateral counterterrorism assistance to the countries of the region.
The overall U.S. aid program to the region, aimed at bringing stability through
strengthening the rule of law and promoting economic reform, also serves to combat
the sometimes lawless climate in which terrorists can thrive.  U.S. aid helps to
develop Bosnia’s export control regime, including over weapons of mass destruction
and dual-use technology.  The United States has encouraged regional cooperation on
terrorism and international crime through the Southeast European Cooperation
Initiative (SECI). In the longer term, efforts to stabilize the region, and thereby
perhaps reduce its attractiveness to terrorists, are also dependent upon integrating it
into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
 For more information on terrorism, see CRS Report RL33600, International
Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by Raphael Perl; CRS Report RL32522,
U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report, by Raphael Perl; CRS
Report RL32518, Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries:  The 9/11 Commission
Recommendations  and U.S. Policy, Francis T. Miko, coordinator; and CRS Report
RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans
Introduction
In the 1990s, wars and political instability provided an opportunity for Al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups to infiltrate the Balkans.  However, U.S. and European
peacekeeping troops, aid, and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration have helped
to bring more stability to the region in recent years.  Moreover, the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States underscored for the countries of the region the
dangers of global terrorism, and resulted in increased U.S. attention and aid to fight
the terrorist threat.  In addition, some countries outside of the region, especially Saudi
Arabia, which were formerly key sources of terrorists and terrorist financing, have
cracked down on Islamic militants, which has in turn had a positive impact on the
Balkans.  As a result of these factors,  many experts currently do not view the
Balkans as a key region harboring or funding terrorists, at least when compared to the
Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe.
Nevertheless, experts caution that the region may continue to play a role in
terrorist plans, largely as a transit point for terrorists, as well as for rest and
recuperation.  There have also been efforts to recruit people from the region into
terrorist groups.  Moreover, observers agree that the region’s continuing problems
leave it vulnerable to terrorist groups in the future.  The July 2004 report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the
9/11 Commission) referred to Central and Eastern Europe as a region potentially
vulnerable to terrorists, due to significant Muslim populations and weak border
controls and security services.1  This problem may increase if terrorists currently
concentrated in Iraq disperse to the Balkans and other regions.  Some sources,
especially Serbian and Russian experts and officials, have claimed that the Balkans
continue to form a more dangerous threat to the United States and neighboring
Western Europe than is usually acknowledged.2
Although large numbers of indigenous Muslims live in the Balkans, due to its
poverty and instability the region has not attracted large numbers of Muslim
immigrants, who have been an important source of recruits for Islamic extremists in
Western Europe.  Moreover, opposition to terrorism has been strong among Bosniaks
(Bosnian Muslims) and Albanians, the largest indigenous Muslim groups in the
Balkans.  These groups  are generally more secular in outlook than Muslims
elsewhere.  Most view themselves as part of Europe and are grateful for the perceived
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U.S. role in defending them against Serbian aggression in the 1990s, and for the
continuing U.S. contribution to the security of their countries.  
Charges of terrorism are often used as political weapons among countries or
ethnic groups to try to attract international support for their cause.  For example,
Serbian and Bosnian Serb politicians often make charges of Al Qaeda training camps
in Bosnia and Kosovo in an effort to discredit Bosniaks and Albanians.  For their
part, Bosniak and Albanian leaders deny the charges and accuse the Serbs of
supporting “terrorism” by harboring indicted war criminals.  Some observers say that
the terrorist threat is in fact much less serious than the region’s more pressing
problems, such as corruption, poverty, and potential political instability.  They say
that the international focus on the terrorist threat may divert attention from these
more relevant issues. 
On the other hand, this rivalry between groups and the international focus on
terrorism may have some positive aspects.  It may push countries in the Balkans to
cooperate zealously with the United States on terrorism issues, in hopes of securing
U.S. support for their regional goals and Euro-Atlantic integration.  In addition, there
may be additional political support in the United States and other countries for
dealing with the region’s problems if they are viewed as a potential source of
terrorism.
 
Given these factors, perhaps of greater concern to most experts than the
existence of a significant Muslim population in the Balkans is the weakness of
government institutions, rampant corruption and poverty.   However, despite these
difficulties, the countries in the region have provided very good cooperation with the
United States in the Global War on Terrorism, according to U.S. officials.3
Consistent with U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted in the post-9/11 fight
against terrorism, these countries have worked with the United States and other
countries to arrest or expel terrorist suspects, shut down non-governmental
organizations linked with terrorism,  and freeze or seize assets of persons and groups
suspected of terrorist financing. 
This report focuses on two countries and a province with plurality or majority
Muslim populations: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo.  It deals with
the role of international Islamic terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda rather than
indigenous nationalist groups pursuing local or regional objectives.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
After the breakup of Communist Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was torn
apart by a civil war between Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, and Croats from
1992 to 1995.  The war resulted in the deaths of many thousands of persons and the
displacement and impoverishment of large parts of the population.  A desperate
Bosniak-dominated Bosnian government, facing an international arms embargo and
outgunned by breakaway Bosnian Serb forces, accepted the help of Iran, as well as
several thousand Islamic radicals, mercenaries, and others.  The 1995 Dayton Peace
Accords, which ended the conflict, required all foreign forces to leave Bosnia.  
Most did, but some Islamic radicals remained behind.  It is estimated that about
700 to 1,000 former fighters stayed behind in Bosnia after the war and became
Bosnian citizens by marrying Bosnian women.  Others received citizenship through
bribing Bosnian officials.  Some Al Qaeda operatives in Bosnia had connections to
members of Bosnia’s intelligence service, another legacy of Bosniak wartime
cooperation with Islamic militants.   The experience of the Bosnia conflict has also
had an impact on terrorist groups worldwide.  Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda figures
mention the Bosnian war as a place where Al Qaeda was active, and as an important
militant Islamic cause.  Terrorist recruiting videos often include footage of combat
in Bosnia.     
In addition to fighters, Bosniaks also received assistance during and after the
war from Islamic charities and humanitarian organizations, many of them from Saudi
Arabia.  Some of these groups served as fronts for Al Qaeda, which  used them for
planning attacks in Bosnia and elsewhere.  In the view of some observers, Saudi
Arabian-built mosques at which some extremist foreign and Bosnian clerics continue
to preach hatred of the United States and Western countries may enhance terrorist
recruiting efforts.4  According to U.S. officials, the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo and
U.S. military bases in Bosnia were subject to several terrorist threats after September
11, 2001.  
Although the terrorist threat in Bosnia appears to have declined in recent years,
some observers have asserted that Bosnia poses a more significant terrorist risk than
often reported. For example, one press report quotes unnamed European intelligence
officials as saying approximately 750 former Islamic foreign fighters in Bosnia
provide a “one-stop shop close to Europe” for guns, money, and documents to
terrorists passing through the region.  Although presenting the threat in less dire
terms, U.S. officials acknowledge that the Balkans may serve as a transit point or
recuperation area for terrorists.5  
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Bosnia and Herzegovina has made strides in fighting terrorism on its territory,
according to U.S. officials.  However, it faces the same problems of poverty and
corruption as other countries in the region, plus institutional failings that are a result
of Bosnia’s recent development.  The Dayton Peace Accords divided Bosnia and
Herzegovina into two semi-autonomous “entities” — the largely Bosniak-Croat
Federation and the mainly Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska — with a weak central
government.  Critics have charged that this structure has stymied Bosnia’s efforts to
develop effective government institutions.  The 2005 State Department Country
Reports on Terrorism notes that, while Bosnia’s counterterrorism cooperation with
the United States was good, the weakness of the Bosnian state could “present an
attractive environment for those seeking a locale to facilitate terrorist activities.” 
U.S. and international efforts to strengthen the central government have been
resisted by the Bosnian Serbs, who frequently charge the Bosniaks with terrorist ties.
In May 2005, Bosnian Serb police chief Dragomir Andan claimed that the terrorists
who carried out the March 2004 Madrid bombings had been trained at alleged Al
Qaeda camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  EU police and other officials in Bosnia
said that they had seen no evidence to support such charges.  Such charges have
coincided with an ongoing effort by international officials in Bosnia to put the police,
a key pillar of Bosnian Serb leaders’ power, under central government control in
order to more effectively combat organized crime and terrorism. 
Bosnian opposition to terrorism has been broad, despite the still-deep ethnic
divide in the country.  The United States still enjoys a strong reservoir of support in
Bosnia, especially among Bosniaks, for bringing peace to the country and providing
post-war aid.  The largely secular and European outlook among Bosniaks has caused
friction with foreign Islamic extremists.  Efforts by the Islamists to recruit Bosniaks
into their organizations have met with limited success.6  Some Bosniaks fear that
terrorists will give Bosnia a bad name in Europe, thereby hindering their ability to
travel there, and setting back Bosnian efforts to join European institutions.  On the
other hand, some experts are concerned that widespread unemployment among
Bosniak youth, coupled with dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy, could aid
terrorist  recruitment. In 2006, a joint U.S.-Croatian intelligence report reportedly
said the terrorist groups were attempting to recruit so-called “white Muslims,” from
Bosnia and other Balkan countries, whose physical appearance might arouse less
suspicion in Europe than a person of Middle Eastern appearance.  Bosnian officials
have offered mixed assessments of this threat: some say that it is a significant
concern, while others admit it as a possibility but note that they have no concrete
evidence so far for widespread recruiting efforts of this kind.7
The 2005 State Department terrorism report discusses an Islamist extremist
organization called Active Islamic Youth, which is associated with former foreign
Islamic fighters in Bosnia.  It says that the group engages in outreach activities aimed
at Bosnian youth and publishes materials promoting Islamic fundamentalism,
religious intolerance, and anti-Western rhetoric. 
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U.S. officials have  lauded Bosnia’s efforts in the fight against terrorism.  In his
2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush singled out Bosnia specifically for
praise for its cooperation with the United States.  In January 2002, Bosnia handed
over to the United States Bensayah Belkacem, whom U.S. officials believed could
be a high-ranking figure in Al Qaeda, as well as five other suspects.  The suspects
were originally from Algeria, although four gained Bosnian citizenship.  All are
currently interned at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  The rendition of these
men to the United States was sharply criticized by Bosnian legal experts as a
violation of the rule of law, as has their continued detention in Cuba.8  Bosnian
prosecutors formally exonerated the men in 2004 after an investigation, and Bosnia
formally requested that the four Bosnian citizens be released from U.S. custody in
February 2005.  The United States has so far rejected Bosnia’s request. 
In cooperation with U.S. investigators, Bosnian authorities have investigated
Islamic charities suspected of having ties with Bin Laden.  In March 2002, Bosnian
police raided Bosnian offices of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF),
which is headquartered in Illinois.  Police found weapons, military manuals, a
fraudulent passport, photographs of Bin Laden, and other items.  BIF leader Enaam
Arnaout, who was charged in US courts with concealing his relationship to al-Qaida,
received an 11-year sentence, albeit for fraud, not on terrorism charges. 
A subsequent Bosnian raid on another group, a local branch of Saudi-based Al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation, uncovered tapes calling for attacks on peacekeepers
in Bosnia.  Another raid, this time on the Sarajevo office of the Saudi High
Commission for Relief, netted anti-Semitic and anti-American materials, as well as
photos of U.S. military installations.9  Other Al Qaeda fronts, such as Vazir (Al-
Haramain’s successor organization) and the Global Relief Fund were also shut down.
In 2004, the Bosnian government disrupted the operations of al-Furqan (a.k.a. Sirat
Istikamet), al-Haramain and al-Masjed al-Aqsa Charity Foundation, and Taibah
International, all Al Qaeda-linked organizations.  Experts note that when some Al
Qaeda front organizations are closed down, others often spring up to replace them.
The 2005 State Department terrorism report said that the government remained
vigilant against previously shut NGOs renewing their activities. Authorities
continued to investigate other organizations, private companies, and individuals for
links to terrorist financing. In February 2005, Bosnian state and entity-level
governments agreed to form a single joint database of all NGOs and associations in
Bosnia.
Bosnian officials have been charged with providing aid to terrorists. In
November 2004, the Bosnian government charged fifteen former Bosnian officials
with illegally helping former foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia gain Bosnian
citizenship from 1995-2000.10  In 2005, six former Federation officials went on trial
for their role in helping to establish an alleged terrorist training camp in Bosnia with
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Iran’s help during the mid-1990s.  Iran, designated as an active supporter of terrorism
by the United States, has not been viewed as closely linked with Al Qaeda, although
it supports groups such as Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad in Israel’s occupied territories, among other groups.  However, most experts
believe that Iran sharply scaled back its activities in Bosnia soon after the end of the
Bosnian war in 1995.11
In 2005, the Bosnian government set up a Citizenship Review Commission to
strip Bosnian citizenship from naturalized citizens who fraudulently obtained their
citizenship, have no substantial ties to Bosnia at present, or obtained their citizenship
because of government error or misconduct.  The commission reviews the citizenship
status of former Islamic fighters and withdraws citizenship, when appropriate. About
1,500 cases fall within the commission’s mandate.  By September 2006, the
commission had revoked the Bosnian citizenship of 120 persons, mostly former
Islamic fighters.  Bosnian authorities announced plans to deport 50 of them, but
reportedly do not know the whereabouts of many of them, because the addresses
given on their citizenship applications are often out-of-date.  Some of them may
reportedly have changed their names, be residing in other countries, or have already
been detained by authorities in other countries as suspected terrorists.  Bosnia had
previously revoked the citizenship of 140 foreign Islamic fighters in 2001 and 2002
but detained few of them, due to a lack of knowledge of their whereabouts.12   
In October 2005, Bosnian Federation police arrested two terrorist suspects with
links to terrorist networks in Western Europe and confiscated weapons and
explosives.  One is a Swedish citizen of Bosnian origin and the other a Turkish
national living in Denmark.  They are accused of planning a terrorist attack in Bosnia
or elsewhere in Europe with the aim of forcing Bosnia or other countries to pull their
troops out of Iran and Afghanistan. Three Bosnians involved in supplying the
explosives are also held by Bosnian police.  The  men went on trial in July 2006.  In
addition, Danish authorities have arrested other persons in their country suspected of
involvement in the plot. 
The 2005 State Department terrorism report noted that, although Bosnia
possesses counterterrorism laws, prosecutors have had difficulty in linking illegal
activities to specific terrorism charges. As a result, they have sometimes sought to
convict suspects on such charges as illegal arms possession, arms smuggling, and
conspiracy, which often result in lighter sentences. 
In recent years, with constant international prodding, Bosnia and Herzegovina
has set up central-government-level institutions that are in part aimed at helping it
fight terrorism and organized crime.  Bosnia has deployed a State Border Service
(SBS) throughout virtually all of the country’s territory.  The 2005 State Department
terrorism report says that the “SBS is considered one of the better border services in
Southeast Europe,” but notes that the SBS does not control a few illegal crossing
points and that many official border posts are understaffed.   Ministries of Defense
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and Security were established in 2004, and the two entity-level  intelligence services
were merged into a single Bosnian State Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA)
state-level service.  Bosnia has established the State Investigative and Protection
Agency (SIPA), responsible for investigating complex crimes including terrorism,
illegal trafficking, organized crime, and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.
SIPA has a financial intelligence unit (FIU), and a sub-unit of its Criminal
Investigation Department is dedicated to counterterrorism and WMD.
In June 2004, Bosnia adopted laws aimed at strengthening state-level law
enforcement capabilities. The set of laws includes legislation giving SIPA law
enforcement and investigative authority for state-level crimes, including terrorism,
and a law on prevention of money laundering.  The Bosnian State Court and the State
Prosecutor’s Office also deal with terrorism cases.  However, most state-level bodies,
with the partial exception of the State Border Service, are not fully staffed or
operational and lack funds, resources, and qualified personnel.13 Bosnia and
Herzegovina is a party to the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism.
Albania
As in the case of Bosnia,  instability in Albania gave a foothold to Al Qaeda in
the 1990s.  Poor internal security, lax border controls, and high rates of crime
produced an environment conducive to terrorist activity.  Some foreign Islamic
extremists used Albania as a safe haven and gained Albanian citizenship.  Some
former Albanian officials were thought to maintain links with these foreign
extremists.  Islamic non-governmental organizations, some of them fronts for Al
Qaeda, were established in Albania after the collapse of the Communist regime in
1991.  The situation worsened during civil unrest in Albania in 1997, when central
authority broke down and large military weapons stocks were looted.  Wars in
neighboring Kosovo in 1999 and Macedonia in 2001 also had a negative impact on
Albania’s stability. 
Terrorist threats in the middle and late 1990s caused the temporary closure of
the U.S. embassy in Albania and the cancellation of planned visits to Albania by
senior U.S. officials. In 1998, Albania and the United States foiled a planned attack
on the U.S. embassy in Tirana, raided an Al Qaeda forgery ring, and arrested several
Al Qaeda figures.14  Since the September 11, 2001 attacks,  some media sources and
political leaders from Serbia have alleged that ethnic Albanian “terrorists” continue
to maintain links with Islamic terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.  The Albanian
government denies that terrorist training camps are present on its territory.  U.S. and
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European government experts say that Albania does not at the moment appear to
harbor a serious terrorist threat.15  
In 2004, Albania announced the discovery of chemical weapons stocks acquired
by the Communist regime in Albania during the 1970s.  Albanian officials had not
known of their existence until they were discovered by accident in a bunker.
Although this cache is now guarded, it had been unguarded during the disorder of the
1990s.  Moreover, due to a lack of documentation by the former regime, it is
uncertain if there are other unreported stocks.  Experts have expressed concern that
some of these potentially could have fallen into the hands of terrorists.16  In 2004, the
government arrested local arms traffickers for dealing in surface-to-air missiles,
which the State Department believes may have been intended for “regional
extremists.”
Albania continues to cooperate closely with the United States and other
governments in sharing information and investigating terrorist-related groups and
activities, according to U.S. officials. Albania adopted a  national action plan against
terrorism in 2002.  Albania  has expelled suspected Islamic extremists and terrorists.
Albania has also cooperated extensively to block financial and other assets of persons
and groups operating in Albania with suspected links to terrorists.  In 2004, the
Albanian Parliament passed a strong money-laundering law that included antiterrorist
financing provisions, bringing Albania’s legislation into compliance with
international standards.  Since December 2004, the Albanian government has frozen
the assets of four organizations (Taibah, International Revival of Islamic Heritage
Society, Al Haramein, and Global Relief Foundation) and four individuals (Nabil
Abdul Saydi, Patricia Rosa Vinck, Yasin Al-Kadi, and Abdul Latif Saleh), all
identified by the United Nations as suspected of supporting or funding extremist
groups or organizations.17 Albania has ratified all 12 UN international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism.  However, the effectiveness of the government’s
counterterrorist efforts are hampered by inadequate financial resources, corruption,
a lack of fully trained officers responsible for borders and ports, and poor
communications and data processing infrastructure.18
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Kosovo
In 1998 and 1999, ethnic Albanian guerrillas in Serbia’s Kosovo province, angry
at Serbian repression, fought an increasingly violent conflict with Serbian troops in
the province.  The United States and its NATO allies, outraged by Serb atrocities
against ethnic Albanian civilians and fearing that the conflict could drag in other
countries and destabilize the region, engaged in a  NATO bombing campaign against
Serbia from March to June 1999.  Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic agreed to
withdraw his forces from the province in June 1999, clearing the way for the
deployment of U.S. and other NATO peacekeepers.  Since the departure of Serbian
troops from Kosovo in 1999, Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
Serbian and Russian intelligence sources have repeatedly asserted the existence
of a strong Al Qaeda presence in Kosovo, allegedly including training camps.
However, observers have warned that caution is needed in assessing these claims,
given that both countries have an interest in discrediting Kosovar Albanians,
particularly their claims to independence from Serbia.  There have been few reports
from Western sources of terrorists operating from Kosovo.  Radical Islamic
organizations, some with links to terrorism, have attempted to recruit followers
among Kosovo Albanian Muslims but these attempts have met with limited success.
Ethnic Albanian nationalists have committed terrorist attacks on Serbian civilians in
Kosovo, but there is little evidence so far that they are working with Al Qaeda or
other radical Islamic groups.
Some observers have expressed concern that powerful ethnic Albanian
organized criminal groups from Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (which play key
roles in organized crime in Europe and the United States) could form an alliance with
terrorist groups, but so far no such links have been detected, according to U.S.
officials.19
 UNMIK has devolved some powers to Kosovo’s Provincial Institutions of Self-
Government (PISG), but the main responsibility for security lies with UNMIK and
the NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR.  According to U.S. officials, UNMIK has
successfully prosecuted individuals for terrorism and developed new tools to combat
terrorist financing. In 2004, UNMIK established a Financial Information Center to
monitor suspicious financial transactions and deter money laundering and identify
sources of terrorist financing.  In 2005, UNMIK police froze the assets of 34
individuals and groups on suspicion of links to terrorist activity.  UNMIK’s Central
Intelligence Unit (CIU) continues to cooperate closely with the United States and
other governments in sharing information and investigating terrorist-related groups
and activities.   UNMIK and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) monitored individuals
entering Kosovo at official points of entry.  Since July 2005, an UNMIK regulation
has required persons who are not employed by an international organization to
register with the KPS’ Office of Foreign Registration upon entering Kosovo.
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PISG, in cooperation with UNMIK, increased monitoring of 11 foreign NGOs
suspected of extremism and issued regulations restricting their activities, including
the appropriation of one mosque. It also required each NGO to submit documentation
that explains its projects and shows its bank accounts. The Kosovo Islamic
Community (KIC) evaluated foreign NGOs and prohibited them from using public
facilities for gatherings if their views were found to be extremist.   In March 2005,
the KPS established an organized crime and terrorist unit, composed of 12 foreign
police officers and 3 KPS officers. UNMIK initiated an ongoing Internal Security
Sector Review (ISSR) that recognized Kosovo’s need to increase its internal capacity
to prevent such future strategic threats as terrorism, inter-ethnic extremism, organized
crime, and corruption.  However, Kosovo’s counterterrorism efforts are hampered by
porous boundary lines easily crossed by individuals trafficking in people or goods.
An insufficient number of KPS border officials limited the ability to monitor wide
expanses of mountainous terrain between crossing points. Corruption among border
and customs officials is also a problem.20 
UNMIK is likely to withdraw from Kosovo in 2007, after Kosovo’s status is
determined.  After UNMIK’s departure, an EU-led civilian presence in Kosovo is
likely to play an important role in Kosovo’s police and justice affairs, although the
extent of its powers remain to be determined.  KFOR will likely retain control of
overall security for Kosovo for some time after a status settlement, but could be
eventually replaced by an EU force in the long run.
U.S. Policy
U.S. officials have cited the threat of terrorism in the Balkans as an important
reason for the need for continued U.S. engagement in the region.  In addition to the
need to combat terrorist infrastructure in the region, U.S. officials say that U.S.
efforts to bring stability to the region also help to fight terrorism.  They note that
political instability, weak political and law enforcement institutions and poverty
provide a breeding ground for terrorist groups.  These objectives are also outlined in
the President’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which calls for the
United States to work with other countries to deny terrorists sponsorship, support and
sanctuary, as well as to work to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists
seek to exploit.
The United States has a variety of instruments to fight terrorism in the Balkans.
One is the direct involvement of U.S. troops.  NATO-led peacekeeping forces in
Bosnia and Kosovo (dubbed SFOR and KFOR respectively) have provided important
resources for anti-terrorist efforts in the region.  NATO troops and intelligence
services work with their local counterparts and independently to track down and
arrest suspected terrorists.  The powerful influence exercised by international
officials in Bosnia and Kosovo gives the United States more freedom to arrest and
deport terrorists than in many European countries, which might object on civil
liberties or other grounds.  
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SFOR withdrew from Bosnia in late 2004, and was replaced by an EU-led force.
The changeover resulted in the departure of most of the U.S. troops in Bosnia.  About
150 U.S. soldiers remained in Bosnia as part of a residual NATO presence that is
tasked with counterterrorism and other missions.  These U.S. troops are scheduled
to be withdrawn from Bosnia by the end of 2006.  The European Union-led successor
force to SFOR also has counterterrorism as part of its mandate.  
In Kosovo, KFOR has 18,000 troops, including 1,800 U.S. troops, which are
expected to remain in Kosovo after the province’s status is resolved, perhaps by the
end of 2006.  KFOR may eventually be replaced by an EU-led force, although U.S.
and European officials stress that KFOR will remain in Kosovo for some time after
status is determined. The reduction of direct international control over Kosovo will
require the United States and other countries to establish closer links with Kosovo
government structures. The United States and its allies have made the creation of
effective mechanism for fighting organized crime and terrorism one of its objectives
in Kosovo.  
The overall U.S. aid program to the region, aimed at bringing stability to the
region through strengthening the rule of law and promoting economic reform, also
serves to combat the sometimes lawless climate in the region in which terrorists can
thrive.  According to the FY2007 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations, Bosnia received an estimated $51.3 million in total U.S. aid in FY2006.
Albania received $32.1 million in U.S. aid in FY2006, and Kosovo received an
estimated $74.2 million.  For FY2007, the President requested $42.9 million for
Bosnia, $27.2 million for Albania, and $79.2 million for Kosovo.
In Bosnia, part of the U.S. aid supports technical assistance, training and
equipment to build the capacities of the police forces in both entities, the State
Border Service, the State Information and Protection Agency, the High Judicial
Prosecutorial Council and other organizations.  The United States provided $40
million to Bosnia in the past three years to strengthen its police and judiciary.  One
project, co-funded with the EU, was the donation of an integrated data network for
Bosnia’s police forces.21 U.S. aid also helps to develop Bosnia’s export control
regime, including over weapons of mass destruction and dual-use technology.  U.S.
aid to Albania also includes assistance to strengthen Albania’s border controls, port
security, and law enforcement agencies, and cut off terrorist financing.  Aid to
Kosovo includes funds to strengthen the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and Kosovo’s
judiciary.  The United States is funding efforts to rapidly destroy chemical weapons
stocks in Albania.  
The United States views the region, with its reputation as a crossroads for
various forms of smuggling, as an important participant in the Proliferation Security
Initiative, which aims to work to interdict WMD-related items.  The United States
has encouraged regional cooperation on terrorism and international crime through the
Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI).  SECI’s Regional Center to
Combat Transborder Crime, based in Romania, attempts to build cooperation to
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combat organized crime and various forms of trafficking, enhance border security,
and improve training for border security personnel. 
U.S. assistance also includes bilateral aid to the countries of the region to fight
terrorism.  The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program provides equipment and
training to fight terrorism, with an emphasis on training the trainers.  ATA programs
provide advice to countries on counterterrorism and police administration and
management, how to teach counterterrorism in police academies, and modern
interrogation and investigative techniques.
In the longer term, efforts to stabilize the region and thereby perhaps reduce its
attractiveness to terrorists, are also dependent upon integrating it into Euro-Atlantic
institutions.   The prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration for the region is encouraging
these countries to take steps that will enable them to more effectively fight terrorism.
The European Union has stated its goal of incorporating all of the countries of the
region into the EU, although this prospect seems a long way off.   
All of the countries of the region are seeking or may one day seek NATO
membership as well.  Three NATO candidate states — Albania, Croatia, and
Macedonia — are linked in the U.S.-brokered “Adriatic Charter,” which is aimed at
improving their qualifications for NATO membership.  The Adriatic Charter
countries have contributed troops to peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan.  In
addition, Albania and Macedonia have contributed soldiers to U.S.-led operations in
Iraq.  Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks the prospect of distant NATO membership until
it unifies its armed forces and security services.  Nevertheless, it has deployed a small
military contingent to Iraq and may join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program if
it carries out defense and security sector reforms and cooperates with the Yugoslav
war crimes tribunal. Kosovo’s undetermined status excludes it from even potential
EU and NATO membership, at least for the present. 
Congressional Response
Congress has dealt with the issue of Islamic terrorism in the Balkans  through
hearings and legislation on global counterterrorism issues, providing funding and
oversight for programs aimed at combating terrorism worldwide, mainly in regions
such as the Middle East and South Asia where the threat is deemed to be the greatest,
but also in other regions, such as the Balkans.  In addition, Congress has appropriated
foreign aid for the Balkans aimed at enhancing stability and improving the rule of law
in the region, objectives that also bolster counterterrorism objectives.  On April 27,
2005, the House International Relations Committee held a hearing on Islamic
extremism in Europe, but the hearings focused mainly on Western Europe rather than
the Balkans.  
Since the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia in 1995, in annual appropriations
bills Congress has authorized to President to withhold aid to Bosnia if he certifies
that the Bosnian Federation (the Bosniak-Croat entity within Bosnia and
Herzegovina) is not complying with provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords that
require the withdrawal of foreign forces from Bosnia or if Bosnian intelligence
cooperation with state sponsors of terrorism or terrorist organizations has not ceased.
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The Administration has not withheld U.S. aid to Bosnia on the basis of these
provisions. 
Conclusion
The United States and its allies have been able to reduce the terrorist threat from
the Balkans over the past decade for several reasons, some of which may be
applicable to other regions and others not.  The U.S. insistence that all foreign forces
leave Bosnia in 1995, backed up by Congressional aid conditions, may have reduced
the possible threat to U.S. forces in Bosnia in the immediate post-war period as well
as removed a serious threat to Bosnian stabilization efforts. U.S. military
interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were perceived by Muslims in the region to be
undertaken to benefit them, thereby bolstering pro-American sentiment.  Most elites
in the region, both Muslim and otherwise, view the region’s future as integration in
Euro-Atlantic institutions, making them especially eager to help the United States
fight terrorism in the region. 
However, observers note that complacency would be unwise.  Conditions could
emerge that could increase the terrorist threat in the future.  The stability of the region
is fragile and law enforcement and other public institutions are still weak.  Some
terrorists now fighting in Iraq may decide to redeploy to other regions, including the
Balkans, in the future.  Conversely, future recruits from the Balkans could also go to
Iraq to join the insurgency.  Terrorists could obtain weapons and explosives from the
region’s thriving black market in such items for use in attacks in Western Europe or
other regions.
